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THINKING ABOUT FAIRNESS & ACHIEVING
BALANCE IN MEDIATION
Sarah E. Burns*
Commentators and practitioners have questioned the possibility
of achieving social justice through alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”).  If fairness, particularly to an underrepresented group, is
elusive where the outcome is leveraged by legal rights and deci-
sion-making is open to scrutiny, the prospect of fairness without
those features seems doubly dim.1  While increasing sophistication
of alternative dispute problem-solving has proven its importance to
achieving social justice,2 the concern in each ADR situation re-
mains that the supposed neutral third party3 may not be neutral,
and that the power dynamics among parties operate to disadvan-
tage the already-disempowered.4
The aim of this Article is to help guide mediators’ efforts to
achieve real fairness and balance in practice.  The thinking offered
here is rooted in extensive cognitive research in the public domain,
and my more than thirty years of professional practice and training
as a teacher, lawyer, discrimination law litigator,5 and social scien-
* Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of  Law; J.D., Yale
Law School; M.A., Stanford University; M.A., University of Oklahoma.
1. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:  Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1367-76 (1985)
(noting that procedural protections of formal justice tend to suppress bias, whereas
informal dispute processes increase the possibility of it operating unfettered).
2. For example, mediation/ADR has been essential to dialogue among a wide
range of communities whose members’ diverse interests are significantly affected by
land use decisions. See, e.g., James B. Dworkin & G. Logan Jordan, Midwest Energy
Utilities, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 61,
62-63 (J. Walton Blackburn & Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995).
3. Whether neutrality is a condition to which we can reasonably aspire is doubt-
ful.  Other conceptions such as balance, fairness, or even-handedness may more real-
istically describe what we can reasonably expect of the mediator.
4. See Delgado et al., supra note 1, at 1391.
5. As chief counsel in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991), I applied many of the principles that ground the discussion here.  In
the early 1980s, I worked with Dr. Susan Tufts Fiske to understand the full range of
social science explanations for discrimination; this work culminated in Dr. Fiske’s ex-
pert testimony in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and in the Jack-
sonville Shipyards case, explaining to the courts the nature of stereotyping and
discrimination as it was evidenced in those cases. Id.
39
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tist6 devoted to answering why we discriminate unfairly and what
we can do about it.
Most recently, I have considered these questions in training law
students how to mediate employment cases.  New York University
School of Law has been fortunate to team with New York City’s
Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (“OATH”),7 which
established the Center for Mediation Services8 (the “Center”) to
mediate employment disputes arising in New York City agencies.
City agencies have the option of referring employment disputes to
the Center for voluntary mediation.9  These disputes include disci-
plinary matters, co-worker conflicts, and claims of discrimination
or harassment that have not culminated in the loss of tangible em-
ployment benefits.10  Students in NYU Law School’s Mediation
Clinic co-mediate with Center mediators.11
The strategies proposed in this Article are a work in progress.  I
first developed the guidelines discussed here to give law students,
and other Center mediators, ideas for balanced mediation.  Medi-
ating in any urban setting, but most particularly New York City,
requires that the mediator have methods to work productively
within a wide variety of group differences.  This is doubly impor-
tant when the mediation involves charges of discrimination or har-
assment, because the mediator needs to understand dynamics of
difference and must help the parties channel those dynamics
constructively.12
6. My training as a social scientist includes related work at two universities.  I
completed three years of coursework and research toward a Ph.D. in sociology, with
an emphasis in social psychology, at Stanford University before I took a leave to at-
tend law school.  Before Stanford, I finished a practitioner’s terminal masters degree
training in human relations at the University of Oklahoma where I focused on inter-
group relations and group dynamics.
7. See City of New York Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, http://
www.nyc.gov/html/oath/home.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
8. See City of New York Center for Mediation Services, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
oath/html/mediation.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See City of New York Center for Mediation Services, New York University
Law School Mediation Clinic, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oath/html/med_clinic.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
12. One may be able to achieve balance consistently without such guidelines when
the client base repeatedly presents the same few issues of group difference in the
same context.  For example, by studying the critiques of inequality specific to the di-
vorce setting, a motivated divorce mediator could become well versed enough regard-
ing symptoms of bias in addressing recurring divorce issues to function fairly without
reference to the principles discussed here.  Relying on critiques of inequality specific
to each setting and each combination of group differences becomes an increasingly
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Drawing from research in social psychology, linguistics, and cog-
nition, I outline sources of bias and some strategies that a
facilitator might use to manage his or her own bias and that of
mediation participants.  The discussion concentrates on dynamics
related to categorization, attribution, use of metaphor, norming,
and framing, which I refer to collectively as “cognitive efficien-
cies.”  As to each of these, the facilitator must first understand how
such a process factors in to his or her own thought and communica-
tion and then how the same process influences the thought and
behavior of mediation participants.  Accordingly, Part I discusses
strategies to manage cognitive efficiencies in one’s own thought
and communication, and proposes a few strategies for addressing
similar sources of bias as they might be presented by mediation
participants.  Part II concerns handling of the emotional dynamics
of discrimination.
This Article should be read as a proposal for further thought and
inquiry.  Any one of the five sources of bias, as well as others not
discussed here, could be the basis of intensive research and train-
ing.  This Article is meant to mark the beginning of such inquiry.
I. MANAGING COGNITIVE EFFICIENCIES
The approaches outlined in this Section could be characterized
as helpful to managing our cognitive efficiencies.13  This Section
describes some key cognitive efficiencies, illustrates how they oper-
ate to produce bias in thought processes, and shows how, if not
managed thoughtfully, they can result in unfair behavior.  The goal
is to help the mediator observe and manage his or her own cogni-
tion in order to produce a more balanced and fair facilitation.  The
advice offered would apply to any decision-maker, including judges
or teachers, but this Section focuses only on the facilitative role of
mediator to simplify the discussion.
As a culture, we value and reward positive knowledge and deci-
siveness.14  Positive knowledge refers to the application of substan-
tive content to a problem.  Generally, our education is focused on
acquiring positive knowledge and related skills.  In doing this, we
ineffective strategy, however, as group membership diversity and issue variety
increase.
13. The term “cognitive efficiencies” derives from discussion by Professors Susan
Tufts Fiske and Shelley Taylor in which they label us “cognitive misers” to capture the
idea that many essential cognitive processes reduce the volume of information we
must use to make decisions and take action. See SUSAN TUFTS FISKE & SHELLEY
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 13, 176 n.2 (2d ed. 1991).
14. See generally, e.g., R.G.H. SIU, THE TAO OF SCIENCE (1957).
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employ a complex set of cognitive efficiencies—mental processes
of simplifying, organizing, and processing information.
But positive knowledge is only part of human intelligence.  The
other, often more difficult intelligence, at which we are seldom for-
mally trained, depends upon skill in managing our cognition, emo-
tion, and interpersonal relations.15  These skills require us, among
other things, to recognize that cognitive efficiencies are but one set
of thinking tools that can, if deployed thoughtlessly, impede crea-
tivity, understanding, and communication.  Essentially, the cogni-
tive management discussed in this Article involves momentarily
suspending action in response to input so that we can mitigate ten-
dencies of bias that are built into cognitive efficiencies.  Because
cognitive researchers have identified patterns inherent to certain
cognitive efficiencies we can, to some extent, anticipate and com-
pensate for their normal operation.
The mediator’s job is to observe communication processes and to
assist the parties in identifying obstacles and making informed
choices about how to respond.  Facilitation is the helping role that
most emphasizes skills of executive management, and most deem-
phasizes applying positive knowledge to the problem presented.
Executive management in this context refers to overseeing and di-
recting the dynamics of a process,16 which may be internal to the
person or external to personal interaction.  For example, identify-
ing, planning, and reflecting upon the stages of a project would be
executive management; implementing the steps of the project
would not.  It is easier to concentrate upon acquiring and applying
the cognitive management learning when one is not also playing
the roles of information source, expert, ultimate decision-maker, or
actor in charge of implementation.  Accordingly, the facilitative
15. See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND:  THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE IN-
TELLIGENCES 237-76 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing interpersonal and intrapersonal intelli-
gence); DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 46-55 (1995) (discussing
emotional awareness as an essential and commonly under-rated capacity). See gener-
ally ELLEN LANGER, MINDFULNESS (1989) (discussing managing cognition and its ef-
fects in relating to self and others).
16. See, e.g., EDWARD DEBONO, SIX THINKING HATS 190-96 (1985) (discussing
“blue hat” thinking managing the other thinking styles); HOWARD GARDNER, INTEL-
LIGENCE REFRAMED:  MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 105-06
(1999) (discussing “executive intelligence”). Cf., e.g., ROBERT LOUIS FLOOD, RE-
THINKING THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE:  LEARNING WITHIN THE UNKNOWABLE (2002)
(finding that the “fifth discipline” is how an organization learns how to learn); PETER
M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE:  THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING OR-
GANIZATION 3-13 (1990) (“fifth discipline” first described).
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mediator’s role is an excellent context for learning and practicing
cognitive management.
This review will cover five general aspects of cognition.  The first
is categorization—essentially, naming our world.  The second is at-
tribution—explaining our world.  The third is metaphor—orienting
our world.  The fourth is normative—prescribing behaviors.  The
fifth is framing.
Narrative, or story-telling, is also an essential cognitive process
that separately organizes our thinking and functions in tandem
with each of the other cognitive strategies.  It deserves separate at-
tention and, as a fundamental cognitive organizing source, has re-
ceived an excellent initial examination in other works by mediation
practitioners.17  The stories that we tell ourselves and each other
about “how the world is” or “what human nature is” fashion our
own lives and the lives of others.18  To the extent that a mediator’s
or a party’s thinking is based upon one or more stories whereby
inequality is justified or necessary, narrative will be a prime source
of bias in the mediation process and would need to be addressed
for fairness to be achieved.19  Narrative is only covered in this Arti-
cle, however, as it relates to the five other cognitive efficiencies.  It
is discussed on the premise that many dynamics of inequality and
unfairness can be addressed by managing cognitive efficiencies
without substantively addressing inequality narratives.
Each cognitive efficiency topic is the subject of vast bodies of
research and writing.  This Article offers a simple introduction cou-
pled with some thoughts about practical application.  Professional
practice of mediation, as well as many other fields, could be im-
proved by systematic application of deeper learning about each of
these subjects.  That said, I have found that even the simple intro-
duction and considered application of the principles discussed here
improves practice.20
17. See generally JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION:  A
NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001).
18. See, e.g., LANGER, supra note 15, at 46-55.
19. That critically important topic deserves study unto itself.  As a practical mat-
ter, narratives that justify inequality have been deprivileged by law in most of the
public life contexts addressed in this Article.  Of course, the struggle to reclaim privi-
lege for such narratives continues and finds overt expression, for example, in argu-
ments against “political correctness,” a theme that may be invoked in a mediation
context to silence claims of inequality or to protest being silenced by claims of ine-
quality, or both.
20. This discussion is not meant to deny the importance of construal differences.
As Solomon Asch’s research on social conformity dramatically demonstrated, even
demographically very similar people can differ dramatically in their construal of any
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The information resulting from discussion of the five cognition
mechanisms has two related uses.  The first use is to improve one’s
own skill at recognizing bias arising from one’s own cognitive effi-
ciencies.  Developing this awareness will also promote the second
use, that of helping others overcome the obstacles to communica-
tion that cognitive efficiency creates.  Part I is divided into two sub-
sections based upon the two uses.  Section A outlines some key
features and dynamics of the five cognitive processes; the purpose
is to help the reader monitor and manage the biases inherent in
their use.  Each subpart of Section A includes a key practice rec-
ommendation and a discussion of the cognition features to watch
for in implementing that recommendation.  Section B illustrates fa-
cilitation tools that the mediator might use to assist others in get-
ting beyond the obstacles that arise from cognitive efficiencies in
operation.  The purpose is to demonstrate the utility of this cogni-
tive management approach.  It is not to suggest that other factors—
individual interpretation, cultural differences, and social values, for
example—are not relevant or important to interpersonal problem-
solving.
A. Mediator:  Managing One’s Own Cognition
This Section will discuss the cognitive efficiencies and strategies
to manage them.  None of the guidance offered here will be useful
if the mediator is not committed to fairness and non-discrimina-
tion.  Accordingly, the first and most fundamental practice recom-
mendation concerns that goal.
Practice Recommendation 1:  Affirm that your goal is to be fair
and non-discriminatory; always look for and listen to feedback to
improve your efforts to achieve that goal.
To be effective in helping, it is important to have the correct in-
tention.  The intention at the center of this discussion is being
fair—that is our goal.  We can never presume that we have
achieved fairness because doing so signals the end of our efforts.
Striving for the goal will require that we try, reflect upon the effort,
and revise the effort according to what we learn from trying.  This
is a continuous iterative process.
meaning source—categories, stories, and metaphors, for example—and many situa-
tional factors can alter construal. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PER-
SON AND THE SITUATION 69-72 (1991) (discussing Asch’s construal research).
Construal differences between and among people are significant and subject to an
array of influences, not necessarily unique to differing circumstances of racial, ethnic,
cultural, religious, or gender identity, sexual preference, or physical or mental ability.
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We may try many different approaches.  Some will succeed,
some may be ineffectual, and some may fail, perhaps utterly.  Fail-
ure and ineffectuality are only significant if we stop striving for the
goal.  Openly acknowledging shortfalls and modifying our ap-
proach reaffirms our commitment to the goal, and illustrates to
those we are trying to help the most important skill of problem-
solving:  attentive, iterative learning.  If we do not impart that
learning, our other efforts, however skillful, will have only a tem-
porary benefit.
Intention is critical to managing our cognitive efficiencies be-
cause it focuses our effort.  It is not possible to think without using
categories, attributions, metaphors, prescriptions, or frames.  The
key to effective cognitive management lies in identifying which of
the specific cognitive efficiency mechanisms we choose not to guide
our thinking and under what circumstances.  But first it is neces-
sary to identify how each of these cognitive efficiencies functions
so that we can identify management strategies.
1. Categorization:  Naming the World
Practice Recommendation 2: Assume that distinction-making,
also referred to as discriminating, is a regular feature of thinking.
Identify distinction-making that is important to stop.  (1) Watch your
own thought, speech, and action to identify when and how these dis-
tinctions aise; (2) Check those thoughts before they become part of
your words and deeds; (3) Assume that you are biased in favor of
members of your own group and against persons in other groups.
As a background matter, we must recognize that making distinc-
tions, and thus paying attention to apparent difference is funda-
mental, normal, and useful to our thought processes.  It is so
common and essential to our day-to-day functioning that we are
usually not aware of doing it.
Having created or applied a category and then assigned individ-
ual items to the category, we attribute to members of the catego-
ries characteristics of the category—whether the individual exhibits
those characteristics or not.  Thinking in this way is unavoidable; it
is a device our brains use to simplify and organize the information
that we must process in perception, memory, and inference.21
Categorization involves some interesting features.  The first is
that we use prototypes,22 what we might call colloquially “repre-
21. See HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE 340-59 (1987).
22. The term “prototype” was used by Eleanor Rosch, who initially developed
prototype theory.  Because of the term’s centrality to the research literature, I use it
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sentative” or “ideal” types, to define our categories, which cue us
to the representative defining properties of the category.  For ex-
ample, we all have an idea of the category “chair” and what it rep-
resents.  We understand a chair to be something upon which to sit
and probably share a sort of ideal chair, against which all other
chairs are judged.  It certainly would have legs, a seat, and a back
able to support a sitting person.  For example, a prototypical chair
is probably the simple straight-backed, hardy, and functional
wooden school, office, or kitchen chair.  If we were asked to think
of a chair, we likely would not think first of an antique Chippen-
dale or a beanbag chair.  Similarly, if we were told that someone
used a chair, without any other information,23 we would likely envi-
sion our prototypical chair and thus remember the scenario as in-
volving that particular style of chair.  The Chippendale and
beanbag are subcategories of chair that depart in some way from
the typical chair, although they do share the defining basic
function.
Once a category comes into existence in a language culture, it is
enriched with meanings,24 which are rarely altered significantly.  If
the category is challenged by the existence of members that do not
fit its typical properties—for example, the beanbag chair—we cre-
ate subcategories to account for the deviation.25
Categories not only denote properties of a group member, but
also group members’ functions.  Applying a category label makes a
here even though it is not a term of everyday language.  For an introduction to the
technical development and testing of prototype theory, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WO-
MEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 39-76 (1987) [hereinafter LAKOFF, DANGEROUS
THINGS]. See also GARDNER, supra note 21, at 340-48 (discussing cognitive theory
development, including prototype theory).  As researchers applied prototype theory
to social categorization, the idea of “schema,” defined as “a cognitive structure that
represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus including both its attributes
and the relations among those attributes,” developed to better describe the array of
relevant cognitive processes at work in social categorization. See FISKE & TAYLOR,
supra note 13, at 98, 139, 96-179.  While the now extensive research on prototypes and
schemas has mapped a complex terrain of cognitive structuring, id., and distinctions
made in this research may become relevant to mediation strategies, the basic observa-
tions about categorization and its simplest cognitive effects is sufficient, and arguably
preferable, to guide the current discussion.
23. In this example, cuing information might be knowledge that the sitter was vis-
iting a child’s recreation room, in which case a beanbag chair might come to mind, or
a fancy full-course dinner at a wealthy person’s home, in which case antique or fine
furniture chair might come to mind.
24. Category meanings with social significance are referred to as “schemas.” See
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 96-179.
25. See id. at 105-09 (discussing schema categorization processes and sub-categori-
zation as a response to various stimuli).
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category’s relevant properties and functions salient about the item
(or person) referenced and excludes irrelevant properties and func-
tions from our thinking.  If we hear that someone used a chair, we
are most likely to assume that the use was sitting.  Without more
information, we would likely not think of atypical chair uses like
standing on the chair to change a light bulb, using a chair to block a
door or to build a child’s play fort, even though we are aware that
these are also possible uses of a chair.  We are unlikely to think of
these uses unless we are in a situation where we need to perform
such a task and do not have objects at hand more identified with
those functions.
We categorize people for the same reasons that we categorize
objects—cognitive efficiency.  Some categorization of people is
necessary to living our daily lives, particularly sorting into func-
tional categories such as “boss,” “the person who delivers fuel,” or
“my child.”  Other categorization occurs because of observable dif-
ferences and related socially-constructed meanings, even if the cat-
egorization has no necessary functional utility in our daily lives, for
example, the categories “African American,” “Asian American,”
“Caucasian,” “female,” “Jewish,” or “Christian.”26
Unlike inanimate objects, which have a limited range of uses and
meanings, people do a myriad of things, fulfill multiple functions,
have thoughts, attitudes, emotions, motivations, and attachments.
As a consequence, people are much less predefined or predictable
than objects.  On the one hand, this makes the efficiency of catego-
rizing people much more important.  On the other hand, the infor-
mation that we lose as we categorize people is greater and more
consequential, particularly when we influence the resources and
opportunities of those we categorize.
When we categorize someone or something, we assign them or it
the qualities and features typical of the category, and ignore the
individual’s other characteristics.  We tend to see category mem-
bers as more similar to those within their category, and more dif-
ferent from those outside their category, than they really are.  This
occurs on the superficial level where a teacher may confuse one
blond male with another blond male, but not confuse a blond male
with an African American male, and vice versa.  It also operates on
a much deeper level, whereby we ascribe to individuals the charac-
26. What we now identify in discrimination law as protected group membership
categories—race, gender, religion, ethnicity, age—acquired meaning because mem-
bership played a role in functional assignments.  The modern civil rights era has, to a
large extent, been devoted to uncoupling group membership from functional roles.
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teristics and abilities stereotypically associated with the group, and
tacitly assume that the individual does not possess other relevant,
and possibly stereotype inconsistent, characteristics.  For example,
a manager might presume that a new female employee is not good
at math although her school transcript shows that she was a math
major while presuming that the new male employee is better at
math than his female counterpart even though that employee
majored in history.  Given the powerful effects of stereotypes like
“men are good at math and women are not,” the manager would
likely be surprised, and a bit chagrined, if after assigning the male
to the “math” job, he or she was confronted with the math/history
major information.  In my experience, during this kind of confron-
tation, some managers are so convinced of their impression, per-
haps unconsciously based upon a stereotype, that they will come up
with stories about why they know that the male employee is better
at math than the female, notwithstanding contrary information.
Sometimes, individuals will cling to such impressions, which may
feel quite powerful, in the face of substantial contrary evidence.
Categorization interacts with perception, memory and inference
and it is important to understand how to counteract the effects of
categorization.  Once our mental processes have assigned an indi-
vidual by stereotypic group membership, even our ability to per-
ceive characteristics that diverge from the group stereotype is
impaired.27  Thus, the straw-grasping manager in the last para-
graph.  At the same time, at least with respect to some group mem-
berships, when an individual possesses characteristics that
dramatically defy their group’s stereotypes—the woman
bodybuilder, for example—we may react to the divergence by
judging that individual member poorly for her failure to conform.28
This bad fit can have a Catch-22 effect.  For example, if the stereo-
type of women is that females are physically weak or poor at ana-
lytical work, each female worker is tacitly presumed inadequate, as
compared with males, in a job calling for physical strength or ana-
lytic acumen.  At the same time, if a particular female demon-
strates extraordinary physical strength or analytic ability, she may
be devalued or discounted because she does not fit the iconic fe-
male “type”29 and accordingly may be deprived of important work-
place benefits.
27. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 121-39.
28. Id. at 133.
29. This bad fit figured significantly in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp.
1109 (D.D.C. 1985).  Ann Hopkins, the sole female out of eighty-eight candidates for
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As people, we find ourselves being members of some categories,
and not of others.  This fact introduces the dimension of in-group
bias—the tendency to favor one’s own group, and its members,
over other groups and their members.30  At least in American cul-
ture and psyche, where one has the opportunity to distribute re-
sources and opportunities, the instinctive act is to give more to
groups to which we belong at the expense of groups to which we do
not belong.  Research has shown that even in a short-term situa-
tion, the simple act of randomly dividing participants into identi-
fied groups will have the effect of group members favoring their
own over members of the other group.31  Accordingly, in long term
situations where members of one group hold the vast majority of
decision-making positions, this tendency alone could account for
much of the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities, as
members of the privileged group cumulate proportionately more
opportunities and resources over time.  Of course, even those not
historically in decision-making positions may be vulnerable to in-
group bias.  Knowing that we all possess this tendency means that
in any helping role we must be alert not to disfavor persons whose
group membership we do not share.
While categorizing is largely an unconscious process, what mat-
ters most is not what any of us thinks in the first instance so much
as what we say and do.  Of course, what we say and do naturally
flow from how our minds function, particularly when we do not
scrutinize our thinking before acting.  In the process of overcoming
our tendencies to make decisions based upon certain categories
that we associate with illegal discrimination, we need to watch for
the unobtrusive indicators of categorizing, such as confusing blond
males with each other, or assuming that girls can’t do math.  By
being alert to such indicators and welcoming them, even as we
strive to stop them, we become more mindful and less discrimina-
tory.  If we hope not to base our actions upon biased thinking, we
partnership, was passed over even though she had brought in more clients and money
than any other candidate. Id. at 1112-13.  When her supporters explained the partner-
ship’s decision and urged her to try the following year, they told her to walk and talk
more femininely and wear more jewelry. Id. at 1117.  We can see from this advice that
there was not only a badness of fit, but also a strong normative rejection of a female
who did not conform to femininity norms.
30. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 133-35.  The research and writing of
Professor Kay Deaux explicates schemas at work in relation to gender. See, e.g., Kay
Deaux, Sex and Gender, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 49, 49-81 (1985).
31. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF, O.J. HARVEY, B.J. WHITE, W.R. HOOD &
CAROLYN SHERIF, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION:  THE ROBBER’S
CAVE EXPERIMENT 117-50 (1961).
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must identify and challenge our thinking when it involves socially-
biased categories.
It is self-deceptive to assume that somehow protected group
memberships do not influence our thinking.  Such social categories
are too pervasive, obvious, and richly meaningful for us to escape
them.  But even if one somehow has been consciously oblivious to
the presence of key social differences, failing to consider the effects
of social difference is the strategy most likely to perpetuate historic
patterns of bias.32
A genuine commitment to equality and nondiscrimination re-
quires that everyone actively engage in monitoring and undoing
our discriminatory thoughts and actions.  By promoting this active
engagement, mediation brings a solution of real value to anti-
discrimination.
2. Attribution:  Explaining Our World
Practice Recommendation 3:  If attributing cause or motivation to
a person’s actions, assume that the explanation can be found in the
situation of the group or individual; framing explanations as result-
ing from properties or characteristics of a group or an individual
signals categorical thinking and potential bias.
To understand discrimination, its dynamics and effects, we must
take into account that historically certain groups have been deval-
ued and oppressed.  With this history, our culture has accreted as-
sociations based upon the conditions of devaluation and
oppression that we now see as characteristics of the group, rather
than situations in which the group finds or found itself.  This obser-
vation leads us to a key strategy for avoiding discrimination:  situa-
tional analysis.
32. Accordingly, basing a finding of discrimination on a requirement that we dis-
criminate intentionally is perverse.  The requirement of intention implies that so long
as we are oblivious to our discriminations, we are not actually doing harm.  However,
we are all mostly oblivious to our discriminations, particularly our discriminations
rooted in historic bias.  Some worry that this fact means that all decisions involving
persons in protected groups necessarily will be found unlawfully discriminatory.  To
the contrary, even in the absence of an “intent” test, U.S. law retains the formidable
requirement of “causation.”  The trier of fact must examine whether indicators of
protected group bias are present and whether the evidence indicates that such bias
actually caused, or played a significant role in, the decision.
We will also more likely find discrimination when the fact pattern is atypical.  For
example, discrimination against a white male will be more noticeable and more likely
judged to be conscious or intentional than discrimination against an African Ameri-
can, even though historic bias is more pervasive and cumulatively harmful.
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Under the rubric of attribution theory, the social sciences have
generated a vast amount of research on the manner in which we
explain the causes of behaviors.33  The most important observation
is called the “fundamental” or false attribution error,34 which con-
cerns the tendency of North Americans35 to explain another per-
son’s behavior by reference to that person’s presumed dispositions
or personality.  This is not to say that individuals have no charac-
teristics or differences from others that might carry consistently
across time and space.  It is only to say that North American think-
ers tend to explain others’ behavior with reference to the supposed
disposition, excluding their situation.
One explanation for the false attribution error is that disposi-
tional explanations are cognitively efficient and do not require us
to identify or think about situational factors.36  In other words,
while we automatically know the situations in which we find our-
selves,37 we have to examine others’ situations to understand them,
and our access to information about those situations is limited.  Ac-
cordingly, it is simpler to explain others’ behaviors by assuming dis-
position as the cause.
In many aspects of life, dispositional explanations, while not par-
ticularly charitable, may be good enough for an individual to func-
tion.  Once a dispositional or trait explanation has been applied,
however, the cognitive dynamics associated with categorization
take over.38  To promote situation-based explanations, it may be
necessary to acquire additional information.  It is also important to
develop a fertile imagination about possible situational influences
on behavior and a talent for considering many alternative explana-
tions at the same time.  Imagining alternative explanations will aid
the information-gathering process.  At the same time, always pos-
33. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 22-92; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 20,
at 69-72.
34. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 67-75; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 20,
at 125-44.
35. The vast majority of this research has been done in the United States on North
American subjects.  Ross and Nisbett acknowledge that attributional biases identified
in North American actors may not be present or as powerful in actors from other,
particularly Eastern, cultures. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 20, at 78-82.
36. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 72-75; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 20,
at 139-41.
37. This explanation in particular has been applied to explain why we might ex-
plain our own success as the result of hard work and skill and others’ successes as the
result of luck. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 78-82.
38. A dispositional attribution functions as a person schema. See id. at 118.
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ing why, when, what, where, and how questions to generate infor-
mation and attending to the resulting answers is crucial.
Attribution interacts with categorization in another important
way.  Where a subgroup of visibly different individuals constitutes
fifteen to twenty percent or less of a group, the visible difference
has a heightened perceptual salience such that the attention of
group participants becomes focused on individuals in the minority
category.39  This is sometimes referred to as the token, or solo, ef-
fect.  As a perceptual phenomenon, this effect can occur for mem-
bers of any group so long as the different group membership is
obvious and visible.40  For instance, a male in a predominantly fe-
male nursing school will likely be the object of such observation.
Similarly, a person of Western European descent in Harlem will be
the object of solo effect observation.  Of course, the harm of solo
status increases the longer and the more consistently one is in the
particular token situation.  Situations of nontraditional employ-
ment for women and for members of historic minorities on the van-
guard of desegregating a workplace will likely show both acute and
chronic evidence of this effect.41
The solo effect has some important results.  First, as the objects
of special attention, members of the minority become objects of
story-telling and attribution, organized around the salient group
difference in ways that majority members are never talked about.
Their behaviors will likely be explained by reference to their group
membership, because attention to group membership has been
heightened or “primed.”42  One woman may be labeled the cheer-
leader, another the mother, a third the femme fatale—all catego-
ries having reference to femaleness.43
Second, the salience will make ordinary behavior remarkable.  If
token women or an ethnic minority socialize with each other, it will
likely be observed by majority members as a rebellion in the mak-
39. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Categorical Basis of Person Memory and Stereotyp-
ing, 36 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 778, 788 (1978); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra
note 13, at 247-66 (discussing research on what captures our attention, including sali-
ence, vividness, accessibility, and priming as factors that draw attention to some social
actors and not others).
40. See Taylor et al., supra note 40, at 790-93.
41. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 83-84 (discussing the experience of
solo status receiving heightened attention, resulting in anxiety and discomfort).
42. Id. at 186, 231-33 (referencing the role of “priming” in relation to attention,
solo status, and salience).
43. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 233-
35 (1977).
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ing, where similar socialization by men or majority ethnic group
members goes unnoticed or is thought to be irrelevant.
A third, related effect is that aspects of minority members’ be-
havior will be perceived and remembered where the same behavior
by a majority group member goes entirely unobserved.44  For ex-
ample, the result may be that lateness of the only Asian-American
worker will be remarked while lateness by the majority European-
Americans is not even noticed.  Supervisors, then, are more likely
to discipline the token for lateness unfairly, oblivious to the fact
that similarly late majority members are going unpunished.  Of
course, the heightened attention creates stress for the minority
members that majority group members in the same setting never
suffer.  Moreover, the resulting unfairness can engender resent-
ment, despondency, or other dysfunctional, but entirely under-
standable, reactions in token group members.  The stress of
attention and sense of being unfairly treated may isolate the token
members and impede their performance.
A final attribution topic worth considering is a defensive attribu-
tion referred to by social psychologists as the “just world” belief.45
This is the tacit, and typically unexamined, assumption that good
things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad peo-
ple, such that the world is “just.”  It is thought that this assumption
derives from the psychological need to feel safe.  As a result we
tend to explain what happens to people by reference to something
they have done, rather than attributing it to chance or causes exter-
nal to the person.46  This mindset can result in what sociologists
have labeled “blaming the victim.”  In a management or problem-
solving situation, this mindset can manifest in the manager’s or
problem-solver’s implicit assumption that a person experiencing
difficulty caused the problem and would be free from it if only that
person had done something different.  The psychological pressure
to operate under this assumption increases where the harm is
greater than the manager’s or problem-solver’s power to change
things.47
44. See generally FISKE &TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 184-99.
45. Id. at 129-30.
46. Id. at 129 (citing research on the “just world” belief by Melvin Lerner and
associates).
47. See id. at 83-86 (discussing factors related to attribution of blame).
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3. Metaphor:  Embodying the World
Practice Recommendation 4:  Be aware of the metaphors that you
use for two reasons: (1) to achieve and maintain openness and flexi-
bility of thought, and (2) to avoid excluding others.
It has been argued that the primary mode of human cognition is
metaphoric.48  If this is true, we face a formidable task in taking
into account metaphor’s impact on our thinking.  Metaphors, like
categories, are pervasive in our thinking and, ultimately, it is not
possible to think without them.  As with categories, accounting for
the cognitive distortion of metaphors is not a matter of purging
ourselves of them, but of identifying the role that they play in or-
ganizing our cognition.  We need to manage our use of particular
metaphors where the resulting cognitive organization has undesir-
able results.
Two features of metaphors should concern us.  First, the use of
metaphors can have the effect of alienating, excluding, or seeming
to disregard certain groups.  A prime example is using the color
black as a negative referent:  “they were dark times” or “he was
one of the guys in a black hat.”  Who among us has not used this
metaphor, or its opposite—white or bright?  And who has not ex-
perienced the awkwardness of having used or heard a version of
the dark/light metaphor in a racially mixed group only to have its
double meaning create at least momentary awkwardness in the
room?  Although it is not clear that there is a direct association, the
pervasive negative association with black correlates to the negative
treatment of African-Americans in our culture.  It is not surprising,
then, that use of such a metaphor engenders embarrassment for the
user and discomfort for others.
Other common metaphors, arguably “mere figures of speech,”
have similar potential for creating awkwardness.  The common
metaphor for goodness—uprightness or upstandingness and re-
lated images—certainly poses awkwardness where mobility impair-
ment may be an issue.  Similarly, the use of vision metaphors for
understanding—”I see what you mean” or “the blind leading the
blind”—may be insensitive when persons in the setting have vision
impairment.  Many associations, particularly of that which is incon-
48. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH
(1999); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1979) [here-
inafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS].
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sequential with femaleness play a significant role in our explana-
tions and descriptions of the world.49
Such metaphors are so much a part of our thinking that it would
be unusual to always anticipate the problematic connotations and
avoid their use altogether.  Moreover, an unusual presence—a per-
son of different ethnicity, a female in a non-traditional setting, or
the presence of a person with an unusual characteristic (mobility or
vision impairment, for example)—primes references to the unusual
characteristic; increases the probability that related metaphors may
come to mind and be used; and, of course, poses heightened em-
barrassment if the reference is made.  We must be prepared for
those awkward moments and not ignore them when they happen.
If indeed discomfort arises, it is better to note aloud to oneself and
those around that the double meaning may be problematic, apolo-
gize, if called for, and choose a different metaphor or expression,
or at least initiate a process of trying to find an alternative.  This
models the proactive approach to overcoming discrimination and
avoids burdening the minority group members with the dual diffi-
culties of either remaining silent or of speaking up.
The second, more dramatic, feature of metaphors is that a meta-
phor, like a story, can literally organize how we see the world.
George Lakoff offered perhaps the most dramatic example of so-
cial organization as a social effect when he discussed the role of
metaphor in politics.50  He concluded that conservatives operated
out of a family metaphor of the “strict father,” around the assump-
tion that social organization best operates along hierarchical au-
thoritarian lines and that people do their best when their
49. See, e.g., ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMEN’S PLACE:  TEXT
AND COMMENTARIES (Mary Bucholtz, ed., 2004) (discussing associations of inconse-
quentiality with women and women’s language).
50. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES
KNOW THAT LIBERALS DON’T (1996) [hereinafter LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS].
Lakoff has been a professor of cognitive linguistics at the University of California,
Berkeley since 1972. See University of California-Berkeley Faculty Profile, http://lin-
guistics.berkeley.edu/people/fac/lakoff.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). Lakoff ex-
plains that he undertook to write Moral Politics after listening to Dan Quayle’s speech
accepting the Republican nomination for Vice President.  He found that he could not
follow the logic of Quayle’s speech while the audience obviously found it meaningful
and compelling.  He found it puzzling that conservatives could oppose abortion yet
support the death penalty and liberals support abortion and oppose the death penalty,
without finding themselves self-contradictory.  The seeming inconsistency and inco-
herence prompted him to look for an explanation in organizing metaphors. See
George Lakoff, Speech to Theatre Communications Group National Conference,
(June 18, 2005), http://www.tcg.org/events/conference/2005/Lakoff.cfm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2007).
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governments, like strict fathers, discipline them and force them to
stand on their own two feet.51  Liberals, by contrast, operate ac-
cording a “nurturant parent” model.52  That model assumes that
people thrive when given the support and resources necessary to
function well.53  He also explains that many people may not fall
into one particular political camp but nonetheless implicitly under-
stand the metaphors and apply one metaphor or another depend-
ing upon the situation they are judging.54  For example, when in a
crisis, many people use the strict father model to determine what
needs to be done, even though the individual would not ordinarily
think and act out of a strict father metaphor.
With his Moral Politics examples, Lakoff has outlined the meta-
phors that may most powerfully organize U.S. social values and
dynamics.  Other pervasive metaphors may organize our thinking,
however.  Many metaphors derive from our experience of the
physical world and being, according to Lakoff, such that we de-
scribe more, bigger or higher as “better,” and anger as a building of
steam-like pressure, for example.55  These and other examples only
scratch the surface on metaphors that may very well dominate our
thought processes, creating tacit conclusions, especially in our eval-
uative systems.56
4. Prescribing and Proscribing
Practice Recommendation 5:  Be aware of the prescriptions and
proscriptions that govern your thinking:  (1) to achieve and maintain
openness and flexibility of thought, and (2) to avoid inappropriately
sanctioning others who do not share your norms.
Prescriptions and proscriptions operate as mechanisms of cogni-
tive efficiency to the extent that they dictate modes of action or
relation in which the holder, or object of judgment, must or should
not engage.  Once adopted, they can simplify, sometimes signifi-
cantly, matters about which the person must think.  We label the
51. See LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 50, at 32-35.
52. See id.
53. Id. Lakoff believes that conservatives disdain liberals’ “nurturant parent”
model as spineless lenience. See id. at 318-20.
54. See id.
55. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 48, at 22-24 (discussing met-
aphors in which more is better, better is up, etc.); LAKOFF, DANGEROUS THINGS,
supra note 22, at 380-415 (discussing metaphors for anger, building on research by
Kovecses).
56. A search of the internet reveals numerous resources regarding metaphors.  A
particularly fruitful source is a site entitled “Metaphors in English” at http://www.sil.
org/lingualinks/lexicon/metaphorsinenglish (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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most significant of these morals or norms.  Socially, morals and
norms may have a boundary-setting function dictating persons, ac-
tions, and social arrangements that the individual or group will ac-
cept or reject.
In part because of their boundary-setting function, morals and
norms can be extremely powerful.  Groups keep their norms in
place by taking opportunities to reaffirm them through the ritual of
boundary maintenance.57  In other words, norms are communi-
cated and maintained primarily by reference to what happens to
those who do not comply.58  Compliance and its enforcement are
essential to a norm’s existence.
Many of our most intractable controversies are set in moral
terms.  One example is the U.S. public conflict over the right to
choose.59  If the conflict is situated outside the normative boundary
for one or more parties, the resistance to resolution will likely be
greater and the mediator must find ways to redefine some or all of
the controversy as not implicating key norms.  Mediating such dis-
putes is a skill in itself and the subject of an important growing
body of literature.  Accordingly, this Article does not address such
mediation.  The important point is that the mediator be alert to his
or her own norms such that they do not impede his or her commu-
nication with and understanding of each party.
Not all prescriptive or proscriptive cognitive barriers involve
morals or norms of great consequence.  Most people, often at an
early age, acquire behavioral norms that will produce behavior that
is ‘correct’ in their respective cultures.  This is best illustrated by an
example.  In my early upbringing, I was taught, as many other peo-
ple are, that it is impolite to point.  Of course, the primary concern
of this norm is the potential adult embarrassment when a child of a
certain age points and announces indelicately, “Look mommy, that
man . . . .”  But many adults, including myself, probably because of
the age and stage at which this norm was introduced to us, experi-
ence a visceral reaction that “pointing is bad” when confronted
with someone who is pointing.  I might have lived my life cringing
whenever someone pointed, had my partner of many years not
been Jewish.
On many routine occasions, my partner, and many of our Jewish
friends, would point without any apparent awkwardness or embar-
57. See generally HOWARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS:  STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE (1963); TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY (1970).
58. See generally BECKER, supra note 57; DUSTER, supra note 57.
59. See LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 50, at 263-70.
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rassment—as if pointing were an acceptable thing to do.  This
posed a puzzle; I was not prepared to label my Jewish partner and
friends rude, but they were pointing in what I was taught to believe
was a rude way.  The explanation came to me during a family Se-
der.  As we began the Seder meal, a Haggadah, the Seder prayer
book, was handed to the attendees and we each opened ours to
follow a group reading of the Passover story and Seder ritual.  The
answer to the pointing cultural difference sat right in front of my
eyes.  On many pages of the book, the text and pictures were em-
bellished with pictures of a pointing finger.  An image came to my
mind of a Rabbi reading the Torah with his pointing finger moving
along at the place in the text being read.  In other words, pointing
was normal for my partner, while disfavored in my culture.
Many other norms regarding gestures and expression give rise to
conflict, often sub rosa, in mixed culture situations.  Looking or not
looking others in the eyes may be regarded as desirable in some
cultures and offensive in others.  Gesticulating while talking is ac-
ceptable in some cultures and not in others.  Eating with one’s
hands, or not, and even elbows on the table, may prompt a visceral,
and possibly subconscious, negative reaction.  The possibilities are
endless and it is unlikely that we will know enough in diverse situa-
tions or with diverse peoples to avoid judging or being judged
badly on the basis of these differences.
We do not always have the answer handed to us as the Haggadah
was handed to me at the Seder table.  More commonly, the only
clue that a normative difference has been triggered may be the vis-
ceral reaction or impulse to label another negatively.  That reaction
or impulse is the moment at which we can decide to suspend the
norm’s operation.  If it goes unheeded, as I suspect happens with
most of us most of the time, and social proximity does not offer
further opportunities for reevaluation, as in my pointing example,
the likely end result is that the person or reference group is
stamped with a negative reference.  If the moment goes unnoticed,
we will be less likely to know how or why we have a negative
impression.
This is not to suggest that we should, or can, suspend all our
norms and values.  The pointing example is useful because, as best
I can tell, pointing has no necessary risk to health or safety for
one’s self or others.  But even where our morals or norms have
some important relation to the welfare of the self, the group or its
members, suspending reaction can still be useful in cross cultural
situations.  Sometimes with a moment’s thought, a solution can be
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found to serve the norm’s ultimate aims without relying on, pre-
scribing, or proscribing the particular specific behavior addressed
by the norm.
At other times, certain values deserve to take precedence even if
they conflict with cultural differences.  In my years of problem-
solving I have encountered many such instances.  A common ex-
ample, is when a woman, suffering physical or emotional abuse
from her husband or partner, seeks counsel from a church elder, a
senior community member, or a family member, typically, although
not invariably, male.  Instead of constructive intervention with the
two parties to redirect the conflict away from violence or coercion,
the woman seeking help receives advice to the effect that she owes
a duty of obedience to her husband or partner, implying he has
some reason for abusing her and it was her responsibility to know
the cause and change her behavior so he would stop.  The norm for
this advice is that the husband is the head of the household and the
absolute boss.60  It often carries with it cultural assumptions that
there can be only one head and that people go astray if not subject
to strict discipline and so forth.
Leaving aside the other cognitive efficiencies at work in this ex-
ample, (gender categories, possible in-group bias, erroneous causal
attribution, and narrative bias), the value system, however sacro-
sanct it may be in that community, must give way to the value of
the safety and health of all of its members.  In my view, any other
approach in the context of mediation violates the fundamental rule
that the mediator not participate in harming the parties.  Regard-
less of how strongly held the norm may be, normative advice that
puts individuals at risk or allows risk to go unchecked should be
rejected in favor of solutions that protect the health and safety of
everyone involved and, if possible, still respect other important
norms.
5. Frame
Practice Recommendation 6:  Identify and suspend cognitive
frames that interfere with your openness in communication; experi-
ment with framing to help parties see things differently.
Most mediators are familiar with the concept of “frame” through
their use of the technique “reframing.”  Generally, framing is a
process whereby our attention is directed in certain ways, to the
60. George Lakoff describes this as a “metaphor.” See id. at 3-4. I find it more
useful to label this as a norm or value system.
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exclusion of others.  Framing, used in this way, is also sometimes
referred to as norming, establishing a norm, or establishing a base-
line where the norm or “baseline” can be any steady state61 or ac-
cepted reality.
Almost anything can function as a frame.  If it serves the atten-
tion-directing function, a category is a frame.  A story is a frame.
A question, by the manner in which it directs attention, and thus
presumes importance of the answer, is a frame.  A causal attribu-
tion is a frame telling us the important source of causation.  A met-
aphor is a frame.  If we can identify a framing mechanism as fitting
under one of these more specific cognitive mechanisms, examining
it first through the more particular mechanism is probably more
useful because we have more specific guidance about how it oper-
ates.  But not all frames fall into one of these more specific mecha-
nisms.  I include “framing” as a process of cognitive efficiency to
encompass additional mental processes not otherwise specifically
characterized.
A person’s individual history and experience is a frame.  For ex-
ample, a poor person will consider a $25,000 prize an enormous
boon; in contrast, a billionaire would not even notice.  Experience-
as-frame may be the most important frame for us to monitor in
ourselves and others.  Systematically applied, situational thinking
may be the most effective tool to contradict the framing of our own
and others’ experience.
Framing is also used by decision theorists in a more technical
way.  In these terms, framing directs attention such that evaluative
comparisons are specifically influenced.  People will judge costs
and benefits of various actions, and experience various degrees of
regret about choices, not with respect to final outcomes, but with
respect to comparisons that are implicit or explicit in the presenta-
tion of the problem.62  Specific framing effects likely to bias our
thinking include loss aversion, the phenomenon where individuals
“are more motivated to avoid a loss of a given size than to gain an
61. A term used in discussing narrative, “steady state” refers to routinely existing
circumstances, as in a story where the norm or status quo is peace and the disrupting
influence is the outbreak of conflict. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome
Bruner, Minding the Law, 46, 120 (2002) (using the term “steady state” to describe
conditions before precipitating events to which conditions return, or from which cir-
cumstances transform into a new status quo).   For a useful discussion of framing as it
guides policy, see DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION:  TO-
WARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994).
62. See ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 20, at 63.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ102.txt unknown Seq: 23 17-JAN-08 14:35
2008] FAIRNESS & BALANCE IN MEDIATION 61
equivalent amount.”63  Similarly, we resist departure from what we
see as “the status quo.”  Often we can blunt the operation of such
decision biases by describing a problem or circumstance
differently.
B. Managing Cognitive Efficiencies of Parties
Once managing one’s own cognitive efficiencies mindfully be-
comes a habit, that most interpersonal difficulties occur, in part,
because the parties deploy different categories, attributions, meta-
phors, prescriptions, and frames becomes obvious.  Of course, the
conflict will remain if the parties have no openness to the other
person’s perspective, which almost always involves suspending
one’s own circumstantial awareness, at least momentarily, to ap-
preciate the circumstances of another.  Even with some openness,
the ability to achieve resolution will range from truce, uneasy
peace, cooperation, to accord, depending upon the denseness64 of
the cognitive and circumstantial difference, the ability of each
party to appreciate the source and extent of the differences, and
the willingness of each party to suspend efficiencies in favor of un-
derstanding.  To achieve resolution of a specific conflict, the parties
need not necessarily appreciate how patterns of cognition contrib-
ute to conflict generally, so long as they understand the source of
the particular conflict and how to overcome it.  The more exten-
sive, pervasive, or long-lasting the conflict and relationship, the
more important it becomes for the parties to apprehend the role of
cognitive efficiencies in the conflict and to learn to manage those
processes.
Just as the facilitator comes to the table with intention, so do the
parties.  Whether or not those intentions are explicit is another
matter.  Ultimately, it may neither be possible nor desirable to
change the party’s intentions.  The only essential element is to en-
gage each party’s positive intention toward understanding the
other party’s situation.  A lasting resolution will only happen if the
63. Id. at 63-64.  These observations derive from the research of Kahneman and
Tversky. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analy-
sis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263-91 (1979).
64. In many instances, people in a shared culture share the same patterns of effi-
ciency, with differences arising in one or two areas.  I would characterize a situation
where the sharing of patterns is extensive as shallow difference.  Cognitive difference
is dense, where the patterns of efficiency differ across more categories of efficiency
and also within each category.
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outcome is grounded in understanding and respects each party’s
core interests.65
The practice rules for the mediator can be operationalized into
mediation strategies and techniques to use with the parties.  The
power of the facilitative mediator lies in the authority to direct at-
tention and effort in one direction rather than another.  Using
knowledge of cognitive efficiencies, it is possible to channel each
participant’s attention and efforts in a manner that counteracts or
balances the natural tendency to employ efficiencies.  Whether, or
under what conditions, to use these techniques must be left to the
mediator’s judgment, which will be informed by the problem and
its context.
A few general considerations are relevant to all the cognitive
efficiencies.
Practice Recommendation 7:  Direct participants’ behavior by
describing positive behavior; avoid proscriptions and “don’t” state-
ments as these are likely to trigger the behavior the mediator is trying
to avoid.
To counteract bias introduced with cognitive efficiencies, strate-
gies of positive conduct are needed.  It is rarely useful for the medi-
ator to tell a party not to do something as in “please don’t call
names or use labels;” that direction draws attention to the very be-
havior the mediator wants to avoid and is more likely to increase
instances of the rejected behavior.66  It is more useful to fashion
direction in the form of “please do . . . .”
Practice Recommendation 8:  Encourage listening and discourage
“explanations” on a topic about which a party is defensive.
65. In some facilitative mediation training, mediators are taught the distinction
between issues and interests.  Issues are defined as things the parties are fighting over.
These are usually manifested when the parties state the source of the conflict.  Inter-
ests are those factors implicated in the conflict that are non-negotiable for that party.
This includes such things as safety for oneself and family, job security, health, income,
reputation, and moral values.  At this writing, I believe that a party’s ultimate inten-
tion with respect to the conflict will lie with that party’s interests.  By showing how a
party’s interests are served and preserved, the facilitator engages the party’s positive
intention.
66. In effect, the proscribed behavior is “primed” by the reference to it. See Fiske
& Taylor, supra note 13, at 146-47, 177-78, 257-64, 293 (discussing the phenomenon of
“priming” and how it occurs).  People, like other creatures, don’t know what to do
when told not to do or think something.  But they can be very eager and resourceful if
their efforts are redirected into an activity other than the one they should not be
doing.  KAREN PRYOR, DON’T SHOOT THE DOG:  THE NEW ART OF TEACHING AND
TRAINING 109-112 (1985). See also GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT
3 (2004).
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Particularly in the context of alleged discrimination, it is possi-
ble, and quite common, for a responding party to reenact the cog-
nitive fallacies at the heart of a conflict by explaining what they
meant or what their motives were or were not.67  This is not helpful
either to the respondent or the complainant, and is likely to derail
the mediation process.  These explanations frequently illustrate the
very biases underlying the complained-of behavior.  While it is im-
portant for the mediator to understand these biases in order to
help the parties reach an understanding, explanations, particularly
the naı¨ve ones that parties typically offer, can do more harm than
good.  It is presumed that the mediator and other party will listen
respectfully as the telling proceeds if the explanation being offered
was solicited by the mediator.  But the ritual of solemn listening
dignifies the very thought processes that ought to be rechanneled,
not reenacted.  This is likely to aggravate the complainant and, if
the mediator appears to remain neutral or approving, prompt the
complainant to believe or feel that the mediation is unbalanced or
a farce.
Avoiding such a circumstance is difficult because it may arise as
soon as the mediator asks the respondent to “tell her side” of the
story.  It also commonly arises when a respondent undertakes to
“apologize,” which may effectively be an effort to excuse bias
rather than cure it.68
The question is how to elicit information necessary for the medi-
ator to understand the dispute and grasp possible bias without also
regenerating the process that caused the dispute in the first place.
The potential problem can be managed through questions focused
first on factual reporting.  Asking the party to “describe what hap-
pened,” and keeping a party on that topic, invites discussion of
events and actions most likely to inform the mediator while avoid-
ing aggravation to the other party.  Even-handedness dictates that
similar questions and directions be made to each party.  The Part II
discussion of the emotional dimensions of discrimination addresses
67. In fact, it is probable that the person, who is not in the habit of actively moni-
toring his or her thought processes, will do just that.  In the context of litigation, a
deposition that explores the allegedly discriminatory party’s “explanations” can be a
very rich source of information concerning the deponent’s biased thinking.
68. While apology is an essential tool in many resolutions, it is only effective if
made appropriately and to the relevant points.  Parties may offer an apology to avoid
conflict, but rarely do they have the skill to promote understanding through its use.
The mediator must actively assist parties to use apology to achieve understanding and
accord.
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the necessary additional step of helping parties work through the
emotional dynamics without reenacting harm.
1. Categorization
Practice Recommendation 9:  Unpack labels and characteriza-
tions.
Parties who tell their side of the story using labels to describe the
other party or to characterize the other party’s behavior are both
categorizing and attributing dispositionally rather than situation-
ally.69  Fortunately, such labels are rarely informative enough that
any of us would mediate without seeking explanation and then re-
framing in more neutral, descriptive, and situation-based terminol-
ogy.  Once the party has had some appropriate amount of air time,
the mediator can ask the party to clarify.  Appropriate questions
might be:  “What was [other party] doing that prompted you to
label [other party] as ‘racist’?” or “What was [other party] doing
when she or he was what you called ‘being mean?’”  Specific be-
havioral explanations may provide a narrow list upon which the
parties can focus in reaching understanding and finding common
ground.
Sometimes parties characterize each other’s behavior in sum-
mary terms.  Explanations such as “he was messing with me” or
“she disrespected me” may have obvious meaning to one party,
and remain completely opaque to the mediator and the opposite
party.  Moreover, specific terms as used in one context or by one
group of people may have a different meaning or connotation in a
different context or with different persons.  The mediator’s skill of
drawing out the meanings is an essential one.  As this process oc-
curs, the mediator will be assessing what other cognitive efficien-
cies are in play.
Categorization frequently occurs even when negative labels are
not being applied.  It is important to listen for special explanations
or stories that may indicate the presence of categories or stereo-
types.  In every instance in which a mediator is working to clarify a
label or summary, the mediator will need to reassure the opposing
party that her concerns will receive attention.
69. See supra Part I.A.2.
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2. Attribution
Practice Recommendation 10:  Encourage parties to describe be-
havior specifically and discuss the context in which the behavior
occurred.
The most direct contradiction to dispositional attribution occurs
when a party describes in detail the context or circumstance as they
saw it, imagines the other party’s situation, and listens when the
other party describes the situation as that party saw it.  This is not
to say that we should encourage a rambling narrative of self-justifi-
cation.  If the opening stages of the process signaled a likelihood of
rambling, the mediator can exercise the prerogative to ask ques-
tions and direct the process.  The purpose is to get circumstantial or
situational factors that logically relate to the source of the com-
plaint and response to the complaint on the table.  For example, if
the complainant sees her new boss as too rigid and demanding,
hearing that the deadlines are imposed by the need for quick turn-
around on a major contract might help the employee see the dead-
lines as reasonable under the circumstances.  Similarly, if a boss
attributes an employee’s shortcomings to laziness, the employee’s
discussion of the factors relating to the supposed “laziness” might
help.  It might be necessary first to ask the boss to describe the
behaviors the boss has in mind in reference to the supposed lazi-
ness, since that word is a summary judgment.  While these explora-
tions may not change the reality—the nature and effectiveness of
management style or job performance—they may point to ele-
ments of a possible solution to be explored.
Many times one party’s response to the other’s perception is not
necessarily to deny, but to respond that the perception unfairly
criticizes her for behavior that others equally engage in.  The sim-
plest approach to such a dispute is to explore, with the parties, in-
stances of comparable behavior on the part of others.  In
discrimination law, this is the classic disparate treatment analysis,70
wherein a targeted individual illustrates unfairness by citing spe-
cific instances in which similar others engaged in the same behav-
iors, exhibited the same shortcomings, and so forth, without
becoming the object of the opponent’s criticism.
The special case of the token calls for some additional interven-
tion because the problem arises from perception bias in addition to
a lack of situational information.  Thus, a token singled out for fail-
70. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 11-14 (C. Geoffrey Weirich ed., 4th ed. 2007).
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ing to file time sheets on time, would point to other late filers who
belong to the majority group.  Of course, the token may not have
access to enough information about other’s behaviors to be persua-
sive.  In that instance, it is typically the complainant’s “feeling” of
unfairness, possibly punctuated with anecdotes, that grounds the
complaint.  This “feeling” might derive from issues unrelated to
group membership.  While the absence of evidence, discoverable
or otherwise, may be fatal in litigation, the fact that the token has a
feeling or perception of unfairness despite the lack of concrete evi-
dence should not be fatal in mediated solutions.
Several strategies, beyond disparate treatment examples, might
be useful.  First, ask the party to describe the experience of being
the only woman, black, or white person in the disputed situation.
The mediator will need to assess carefully whether, or perhaps
more accurately, to what extent, this discourse asks that person “to
bleed in front of sharks,”—exhibit weakness that will only invite
vicious attack rather than move the parties toward a solution.  The
answer may lie in two assessments.  The first is, for the token, how
acute the particular harms, and their emotional manifestations,
might be.  The second assessment is to what extent the other party
is genuinely interested in seeking a mediated solution.  If the medi-
ator concludes that the token party is emotionally ready and will-
ing to undertake the discussion and the other party is sensitive
enough not to humiliate her and is not exploiting mediation for
other ends, asking the token to describe the unique situation of
being one of a kind in the dispute setting may make sense.  This is
not to say that it will not be frustrating to the individual who, espe-
cially working in a token situation, may continually be in the role
of educating majority group members.  The mediator will need to
proceed tactfully and change the subject if the process of describ-
ing the experience is apparently unhelpful or too stressful.
Second, it may be useful, possibly in caucus, for the mediator to
talk with the non-token party about the problem of heightened at-
tention, its typical invisibility to the majority, and acute stress to
the token.  The mediator might also ask the respondent whether it
is possible to develop methods to detect majority members’ short-
comings.  If, for example, lateness is the issue, a mechanism
whereby everyone’s arrival time is routinely recorded, without ex-
ception, might either reveal the problem or stop lax practices.  The
efficacy of any such solution depends upon a sound plan and good
faith implementation.
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Such brainstorming might be buttressed by a joint session discus-
sion, either before or after caucus, of the particular kinds of behav-
iors for which the token party has been singled out and what
evidence might exist to check that reality.
3. Metaphor
Practice Recommendation 11:  Take responsibility for using meta-
phors that are awkward to others and also for feeling awkward
around such uses; invite yourself and others to generate alternate
forms of expression.
An object of metaphor is most likely to come up at the media-
tion table when an insensitive use of a metaphor is part of the com-
plained of behavior.  In such circumstances, the complainant may
feel indignant and unheard and the respondent may be defensive
and angry—being blamed for a “mere slip of the tongue.”  Both
parties are right, in a sense, and no amount of dwelling on the ap-
propriateness of the metaphor’s use will solve anything.
The mediator might model a new solution for the respondent by
owning up to having used similar metaphors and since then having
struggled to anticipate the problem and find alternative expres-
sions.  Acknowledge the ordinariness of such usages while legiti-
mizing the complainant’s desire to stop such usage.  On the
strength of that admission, the mediator might invite each party to
generate a list of metaphors having possible negative connotations
for that party.  If both parties generate a sizeable list, exploring
some items on each list might reinforce for each party the problem
that the other faces.  Of course, societal denigration tends to be
asymmetrical.  If, for example, a European-American party has dif-
ficulty generating much of a list, that fact in itself could be ex-
amined.  While it is not a substitute for recognizing one’s own
feelings under similar circumstances, it does dramatize that the two
people effectively live in very different worlds even while working
side by side.
Addressing a metaphor becomes more complicated and conse-
quential when it is cited by the complainant as one example of
words and deeds giving rise to a hostile work environment.  In that
instance, the metaphor is part of a cumulative pattern and the com-
plainant may be saying that any single act or deed would not itself
have prompted a complaint where the combination did.  Under
these circumstances, discussing each individual word or deed
misses the point; it is more useful for the mediator to direct atten-
tion to the cumulative effect.  Whether the complainant either did
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or did not complain about the individual words or deeds at the
time that they occurred may be an ancillary problem.  This inquiry
automatically puts the complainant on the defensive and in a lose-
lose position.  If the complainant did not complain at the time, the
respondent may argue that the conduct was not sufficiently impor-
tant, that the respondent had no opportunity to fix it, or both, and
is therefore not something for which the respondent should be held
accountable.  If the complainant did complain when the individual
instances occurred, the situation at the time of the mediation is
probably more difficult because the complainant may already have
been labeled and dismissed as a crank who takes offense at minor
things.  Whichever avenue was pursued, it may be useful for the
mediator to identify these dual horns of the complainant’s dilemma
and the lose-lose position that the complainant faced regarding
complaint-making.  Similarly, the respondent’s possible responses
can also be described as potentially reasonable, even if not en-
dorsed as an effective solution.  With that as a frame of reference,
both parties can turn to discussing solutions that would avoid the
situation in the future.
Occasionally it may become apparent that one party’s approach
to the core problem can be described as guided by a particular met-
aphor.  To borrow George Lakoff’s example, the “Strict Father” or
the “Nurturant Parent” models are metaphors that an employer
might implicitly apply as a model for supervision.71  It is unlikely
that a mediator could effectively eliminate a party’s organizing
metaphor.  Moreover, the metaphor may have important positive
uses.  Rather than try to eliminate the metaphor, the mediator
might accept its core function and mitigate its negative effects.  The
employer who thinks that employees are being given a great op-
portunity to thrive and, if left to their own devices, will do so, as
per the nurturant parent style, may experience dismay with the em-
ployee who has not responded well to that leadership style.  Simi-
larly, the employer who keeps strict protocols and believes that
criticism is the road to improvement may have difficulty with the
independent employee who rebels or feels stifled.
Without necessarily discussing the metaphor and its role, the me-
diator can use it, although this must be done thoughtfully so as not
to annoy the other party, or leave the other party feeling criticized
by the facilitator.  The facilitator might say to the “nurturant par-
ent” employer, “I understand that you want to create an environ-
71. See LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 50, at 32-35.
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ment in which your employees can thrive and grow.  What I am
hearing from you and [other party] is that there are aspects of the
situation or work on which, right now, [other party] needs your
specific guidance before she can take over.  Why don’t we talk
about those in more detail so we can think about particular strate-
gies.”  In metaphorical terms, with reference to the complained-of
job performance, it is being suggested without being said that the
employee party is at a stage of growth, such as a child, at which
autonomy is not yet appropriate.  Of course, it could be offensive
to talk expressly in those terms (e.g., parent-child), so the refram-
ing must avoid invoking them even while being informed by them.
Similarly, the mediator might say to the “strict father” employer,
“I understand that the work is such that your team needs strong
discipline and close guidance.  At the same time, I am hearing that
[opposite party] has been on the team a long time, and understands
your needs and demands.  Is it possible to organize/define the work
so that your needs are met while [opposite party] has a little more
freedom to bring the insights she might have to offer?”  In family
metaphor terms, the employer or “parent” is being told that the
other party is at a stage of growth, “teenager” or “young adult,” at
which guided autonomy may benefit the team, and where strict dis-
cipline might get rebellion rather than effective performance.
While metaphors that guide a subordinate may not enjoy the
same power to define the situation outside the mediation room,
these metaphors may nonetheless play a major role in that room.  I
once had a complainant who kept calling the other party “the
devil.”  I am sure this label embodied a rich cultural reference that
I and the other party did not understand and the mediation was
unlikely to progress very far until its meaning became clearer.  The
first obvious strategy was to move discussion from label to de-
scribed conduct, and to elicit information concerning the circum-
stances.  But it also seemed highly likely that the term invokes a
kind of metaphor that determined the party’s interpretation of the
problem and thus circumscribed possible solutions.  My strategy in
the first instance when faced with such categorization, is to ask for
explanation:  “What do you mean by ‘devil’?” or “What does a
devil do or say?”
Organizing metaphors are extremely powerful and tricky to
work with.  As illustrated in the discussion of the “family” meta-
phor, recognizing the metaphor gives the mediator a powerful tool.
At the same time, the mediator has to use the metaphor sensitively.
It is not easy to recognize an organizing metaphor and employ it
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thoughtfully on the spot.  Accordingly, research into and elabora-
tion upon possible metaphoric frames of reference in a party’s
problems is important if mediation is to achieve richer problem-
solving.  Luckily, linguists and cognitive researchers have described
in detail a vast number of metaphors, and how they work, in com-
mon usage.72  The task for the mediation researcher is to identify
those metaphors most likely to appear in the mediation context
and develop reframing strategies so that mediators can be thought-
fully trained in working with the metaphor productively.
4. Prescriptions/Proscriptions
Practice Recommendation 12:  Develop skills and strategies to
quickly address when (1) the party’s norms are fundamentally in
conflict; (2) parties share a norm but disagree as to whether it has
been breached; (3) parties are unaware that one or more norms fig-
ure in the conflict; and (4) a norm has unnecessarily been used to
solve a problem where less burdensome strategies may be available.
Normative standards can figure in conflicts in a host of different
ways.  It is useful to outline a few of them.  The first and most dra-
matic, a topic not being examined here, occurs when the conflict
arises from the parties’ distinctly different norms, values, or beliefs.
A second occurs when the parties share beliefs or norms but differ
as to whether one party has violated the norm.  A third occurs
when a party is unaware that her beliefs or norms play a significant
role in her side of the conflict.  A fourth occurs when one party
seeks to impose norms to resolve the conflict and the norms im-
posed are more burdensome to the other party.  The third and
fourth circumstances are discussed in this Section.
In my experience, the key to working with prescriptions or pro-
scriptions as obstacles to communication or understanding is deter-
mining that they are in play and identifying their relevance.  Just as
I experienced an irrationally strong negative reaction to pointing,
many parties come to the mediation table with, in at least some
part, a similar proscriptive reaction.  Even where the prescription
or proscription is not irrational, it can be worked with if identified.
A common example worth discussing is where supervisors or co-
workers object to or are offended by co-workers speaking a native
language other than English.  The objection is often strong and
stated with self-righteous indignation; it might also be coupled with
an ad hoc “rule” that “only English” may be spoken in the work-
72. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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place.  The co-workers whose native language is not English may
experience the objection as pure discrimination, and feel hurt at
being chided for enjoying their momentary relief from having to
communicate in a second language.
Let’s start first with the non-English speaking employees, since
their non-English communication has become the focus of the con-
flict.  Simple relief at speaking in one’s native language is certainly
a sufficient motivation.  The fact that speaking one’s first language
enables one to communicate better is a further benign explanation
for the behavior, and one at which the reasonable person would
not take offense.  No surprise then if the non-English speakers ex-
perience the criticism as pure discrimination.
But these reasons are rarely the ones attributed to the events by
the objectors.  The objectors may find it “rude to talk behind our
backs” or feel that they are being ridiculed.  If they were in fact
being ridiculed, their offense is justified and they likely can identify
other behaviors that reflect this disrespect.  For example, if the
non-English communication took place on the heels of a conflict or
if the participants are glancing, laughing, or glaring in the direction
of the objectors, the inference that criticism or backtalking is going
on is not unfounded.  In that case, the core offense is not language
per se but the original conflict and its lack of meaningful resolu-
tion.  Language use might be a factor addressed in the resolution to
the extent that it was a tool to further the conflict or hide disrup-
tive or disrespectful behavior.  The discussion can then turn to re-
spect in the workplace, and perhaps the event or conflict provoking
the offensive non-English discussion.  The call for a draconian En-
glish-only rule can then be put on the back burner eventually to be
abandoned when other resolutions are accomplished.
If the non-English discussion was indeed benign and not
targeted, the facilitation takes a different turn.  The feelings of the
objectors are still relevant, if not factually grounded in the confab,
but the direction of solution is somewhat different.  How does one
proceed?  The first step in both scenarios is understanding what
was going on when the non-English communication occurred.
Asking the objectors to reconstruct the experience might yield in-
formation that better explains their reaction.  If the explanation
emerges, the solution again heads toward a solution other than a
language bar.
It may be that the feelings of paranoia have no origin in the ac-
tual workplace situation.  Perhaps they arise from the fear, perhaps
based in early life events, of “being talked about behind one’s
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back.”  Equally likely is that they originate, like my reaction to
pointing, from another politeness norm, of “not whispering in the
presence of others.”  Thus, we have come full circle.  If the media-
tion reaches this insight, the objector now recognizes that her feel-
ings arise in his or her past experience and upbringing, and the
perception of being disrespected is overcome.  Moreover, the non-
English speaker may have both explained the sheer relief at being
allowed to speak her native tongue such that the self-conscious ob-
jector can appreciate and respect it, and also come to appreciate
the awkwardness that it posed to the other party.
In the foregoing example, unstated proscriptions were only one
possible source of the conflict yet a new and highly burdensome
proscription of English-only communication was being pursued as
the sole solution, whatever the source of the problem.  The simple
solution, which promised to be exceedingly burdensome to one
party, called out for richer understanding that would then become
the avenue to alternative, more reasonable and fair, solutions.
5. Framing
Practice Recommendation 13:  Preempt party’s frames by present-
ing alternative frames early in the discussion.
Once a frame has become the basis of discussion, it is very diffi-
cult to change it.  Accordingly, if the mediator can orient discussion
of topics and issues within a balanced frame, significant communi-
cation and problem-solving barriers will be removed.
As one framing strategy to achieve balance without reenacting
and dignifying bias, the mediator might start the mediation by ask-
ing each party to adopt an assumption temporarily.  The complain-
ant may be asked to assume, for the sake of discussion, that the
respondent did not intend to do harm and had legitimate reasons
for her actions.  Correspondingly, the respondent may be asked to
assume that the behaviors complained of and the resulting harm
alleged by the complainant are real in their effect, regardless of
their motivation.  The mediator can assure both parties that each
may reject the assumption any time during the mediation while
proposing these assumptions as a useful strategy for positive prob-
lem-solving.  The benefit of this intervention is twofold.  First, it
lessens the impulse of each party to persuade the mediator, or the
other party, that she is right.  Second, if the parties attempt these
assumptions in good faith, they will approach the discussion in a
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constructive frame.73  If one or both parties object then, a discus-
sion of the reasons may prove useful.
Anticipating and shifting cognitive frames, such as loss aversion
and status quo bias, can similarly remove resistance to problem-
solving.  For example, if the workplace is a place where “Joe” and
his cronies pretty much interact how they want, then any change to
accommodate newcomers is disfavored by “the status quo.”  If the
workplace is a place where all workers adhere to a norm of mutual
respect and professionalism, then accommodating newcomers is
the norm and not disfavored by the status quo.  The bias of the
status quo is probably the strongest argument for standardizing
workplace interactions along “professional” lines.  Manipulating
language alone is not enough to shift a status quo frame of this
sort.  The facilitator would need “Joe” to adopt the norm of profes-
sionalism as his own and vouch for others in the workplace that are
not present at the mediation.  Moreover, no mediation based upon
such strategy can legitimately be seen as complete and durable un-
til mechanisms whereby the affected group will buy in have been
mapped out.
II. PERSPECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
While examining bias inherent in cognitive efficiencies is a good
discipline to change bias and unfairness in behavior, no mediator
can work sensitively without understanding the role of perspective
in all communication and problem-solving.  The most dramatic fac-
tor in perspective is that arising from being a member of some
groups and interacting with members of other groups.
The mediator can never forget that she, like each party, brings
her own perspectives to the process.  The mediator is a member of
some groups and not others.  This fact in itself points to a potent
source of bias—that of the in-group.74  Not only do we in the
United States possess an instinct to feather our own nests, and the
nests of those with whom we identify, but we also are more likely
to share experiences with those who are more similar to us or who
are identified with groups of which we are members.  For that rea-
son, our imaginations are much richer about situational factors af-
73. PHILLIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTI-
TUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 79-83, 101-07 (1991) (discussing foot-in-the-
door and role-playing techniques to promote attitude change, which must be read
together with remaining text to understand interaction with self-justification effects
likely operating in mediation).
74. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ102.txt unknown Seq: 36 17-JAN-08 14:35
74 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
fecting the behaviors of those like us or who share our
circumstances.  Accordingly, we are likely to be biased even in our
ability to apply situational thinking to understand other parties.
The potency of these factors, and the benefits of having different
perspectives at the mediation table, lead to another practice
recommendation.
Practice Recommendation 14:  To manage issues of difference ef-
fectively, co-mediate with partners whose group membership is dif-
ferent than your own, and preferably relevant to the difference issues
among parties and their situations.
As a threshold matter, it is the mediator’s obligation to deter-
mine whether she is an appropriate person to mediate a particular
problem with particular parties.  The answer to this question de-
pends upon the mediator’s skill, experience, and training, and her
assessment of whether a particular problem or party presents issues
that the mediator is able to address or will find problematic.  This is
a complex assessment that this Article does not address.  That said,
it is important to recognize that one’s own group membership is
not necessarily a bar to mediating particular problems or with par-
ticular parties, but may be a significant obstacle.  We must each
train ourselves to mediate successfully with individuals who are
members of our own groups as well as members of other groups.
Co-mediation, with attention to diversity between mediators, is a
useful strategy to address this constant problem.
A related problem of potential unbalance is the relative influ-
ence that each party wields.  In any mediation context, a host of
factors may contribute to asymmetry of power, information, status,
and resources among the parties.  It is natural in our day-to-day
dealings for us to defer to persons who possess more of these re-
sources relevant to a given situation.  Moreover, indicia of power,
status, and resources induce deference in situations to which they
are not particularly relevant.  In my experience, mediators, regard-
less of their own group affiliations, can easily fall into such defer-
ence.  The mediator should not be swayed in one party’s favor
because that party possesses more, or less, of any resources.  Nor
should the mediator be more favorably disposed to one party be-
cause that party’s demeanor commands authority or sympathy.
Achieving balance in the face of just these influences is a daunting
task.  Co-mediation, coupled with active feedback among
mediators, is one device to help ensure balance is achieved and
maintained.
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While striving for balance, we cannot ignore that certain situa-
tional imbalances are nonetheless relevant for certain purposes in
mediation.  The fact, for example, that one party is boss and the
other employee cannot be left outside the mediation room door if
meaningful durable workplace solutions are to be crafted in the
room.  Acknowledging such situational realities does not mean that
the mediator defers to one party.  Such deference would not help
either party.  The sensible approach is to acknowledge the role dif-
ferences and test in small progressive steps the pertinence of role
difference to any potential solution.
Practice Recommendation 15:  Avoid reenacting the harms of dis-
crimination by keeping the mediation process focused on changes
that would benefit the parties and improve the situation regardless of
fault; leave exploration of who was at fault for the courtroom.
Whether “discrimination” has occurred or not, is not a subject
for the facilitative mediation, even if the dispute concerns charges
of discrimination.75  The facilitative mediator must mediate as if it
is equally likely that (1) discrimination did and did not occur; (2)
reasons other than bias account for behavior complained of, and;
(3) shortcomings of performance on the part of each party may or
may not be a factor.  Mediating as if all of these are simultaneously
true is not an unrealistic stance.  To the contrary, legalities aside,
elements of almost every situation are likely to include bias, other
causes and consequences of behavior, and shortcomings of per-
formance on the part of all participants.
Assume for the moment that the mediator, with respect to her
own cognition, is successfully implementing the guidance outlined
in this Article.76  She has the foundation upon which to effectively
manage interpersonal dynamics in the ADR context.  She must ap-
prehend the damage caused by discriminatory targeting and how it
75. There exists a difference between a facilitated resolution and an evaluative
settlement process.  In the latter, the third-party neutral is expected to evaluate key
aspects of the problem, which could include the occurrence of discrimination.  In gen-
eral, I favor a facilitative process as an early intervention where lines of communica-
tion are still somewhat open between the parties and loss of tangible job benefits has
not been significant.  The target of alleged discrimination is at a substantial disadvan-
tage where communication is substantially or completely impaired and significant ec-
onomic loss has occurred.  In many cases, balance in facilitation or evaluation
depends upon factors beyond the mere skill of the neutral and is unlikely unless the
target has had counsel and the benefit of discovery.
76. This assumption is framed as an ongoing process.  We cannot know whether
we have indeed achieved full mastery over our discriminatory tendencies such that we
can be certain that we ourselves or other well-meaning persons are not, at the least,
perpetuating discrimination.
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might manifest itself in interpersonal problem-solving.  She must
also appreciate the dilemma of the respondent, who is likely uned-
ucated regarding the biases of cognitive efficiencies and in a defen-
sive position and state of mind.  To achieve a successful resolution,
the mediator must manage each party’s emotions and see through
their presentation of the problems to identify the core issues.  One
can easily be distracted by the manner in which each party ex-
presses her or his concerns and miscalculate the attention needed.
A person responding to a charge of possible discrimination, or to
any claim of wrongdoing, however minor, is understandably defen-
sive.  Defensiveness can manifest in many different ways, including
indignation, denial, and aggressiveness.  All of these responses are
normal and appropriate; being accused of wrongdoing is painful
and difficult.  Moreover, the consequences are potentially devastat-
ing.  The mediator’s task is to move the respondent’s attention
from fear and defensiveness to constructive action.
As to a respondent who is alleged to have discriminated, the first
and foremost question should be how the perceiver or judger was
being guided.  For mediation purposes, if the relevant perception
or judgment was even in part influenced negatively or stereotypi-
cally by the target’s group membership, both parties can gain by
changing that.77  At the outset, a respondent is unlikely to have,
much less share, insight that bias guided his or her judgment.  By
unpacking categories, metaphors, norms, and frames, and pursuing
situational analysis, the mediator may tease out information that
might lead to revisiting a conclusion incorporating possible bias.
These efforts are not guaranteed to be fruitful, however, it is better
to proceed in this manner than to preside over a process whereby
the respondent redignifies or reenacts discrimination complained
of.
If legally actionable discrimination has occurred, only those who
discriminated can change it.  We perpetuate an erroneous model if
we proceed as if behavior on the part of the target accounts for the
discrimination.  In short, no one ever deserves discrimination.  In
discrimination litigation, much attention is paid to whether the tar-
get of the alleged discrimination did something to justify the action
77. If there is no indication of active vigilance against such discrimination on the
perceiver/judger’s part, we know from the research on categorization and stereotyp-
ing that it is likely that the perceptions and judgments were stereotypical and discrimi-
natory in some part.  At this point, the law recognizes that discrimination might be a
partial cause.  If discrimination is shown, then the question left is not liability but
damages. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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of the alleged perpetrator of discrimination.78  While this approach
may be necessary in the context of proving or disproving discrimi-
nation, it focuses attention on the wrong subject for solving the
problem of discrimination.
To mediate in a balanced manner that does not reenact the harm
of discrimination if it has occurred, the mediator must not pursue
discussion or explanation framed as if the target’s behavior ex-
plains the alleged discrimination.  An alleged perpetrator may be
convinced that something about the target warrants the discrimina-
tory treatment and there is little, if anything, the object of discrimi-
nation can do to change that perception.  These topics—the
behaviors of the alleged discriminator and of the complainant—
must be discussed as distinctly different.  The framing suggestion of
Practice Recommendation 13—asking each party to assume argu-
endo the truth of the other’s perception—is one technique to
achieve this.79 It may not be necessary, however, to make this ex-
plicit; simply steering discussion in such a manner that the topics
are pursued as distinct and unrelated may be equally or more
effective.
Being the object of discrimination is an experience of profound
disempowerment.  People respond to it in a wide variety of ways—
with anger and indignation, with resignation, by shutting down al-
together, or with acceptance, to name only a few possible re-
sponses.80  Every response is natural and warranted, and an
individual’s responses may change over time.  We must not indulge
the notion that there is a right way to be the target of, or manage,
discrimination.  The harms of discrimination can be cumulative
with the result that a single, seemingly isolated act of discrimina-
tion can trigger a strong response.  Moreover, while anyone can be
the target of discrimination, undeniably members of some groups
rather than others are more likely to have encountered unfair dis-
crimination repeatedly and in various contexts.  Ironically, the one-
78. In the context of an employment discrimination claim, this happens when the
employer alleges a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.  What typically ensues is defendant’s extensive proof concerning the plaintiff’s
alleged performance shortfalls.  The plaintiff then tries to counter with proof that the
alleged reason is a pretext, which if proven leaves the inference that the adverse ac-
tion was due to discrimination.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (explaining plaintiff’s burden of proof in federal employment
discrimination actions).
79. See supra Part I.B.5.
80. See generally PREJUDICE:  THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE (Janet K. Swim &
Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (reporting research on the experience of being the target
of discrimination).
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time target of discrimination may feel the harm more acutely and
others may see the discrimination as more wrongful, precisely be-
cause it is an unusual event, and thus more salient.  Chronic dis-
crimination more easily goes unnoticed or gets explained away
even when it is more extreme and damaging either in the discrete
occurrences or cumulating harm over time.  A corollary to this is
that the chronic target may tolerate more unfairness longer and in
greater silence while bystanders are less alert to the damage being
done.  The mediator may need to assist the parties to address the
impact of chronic, cumulative, and pervasive effects that may lie in
the background.
For those who suffer repeated and chronic discrimination, the
experience may not be attributable to a single actor and certainly
would not be attributable to a single event or moment in time.
This explains why some chronic targets are slow to complain, even
about acute events, and why they may experience difficulty parsing
and assigning harms to particular acts at particular times.  It may
also partially explain why a target’s reaction to a single event may
appear out of proportion to the particular action.81  It is important
that the mediator give context to such reactions and not dismiss
them because they appear out of proportion.  Exploring deeper
context may bring both parties to appreciate the source and
strength of the harm without either diminishing it or wrongly lay-
ing all of the blame on the responding party at the table.
Claims of discrimination evoke strong emotions in all partici-
pants.  The mediator must not let strength of emotion, or its man-
ner of expression, induce an unbalanced response.  Mediators, as
peace-makers and promoters of compromise, are likely to prefer
some party’s possible responses over other possible responses.  The
angry party is harder to manage than the resigned party.  Moreo-
ver, when the one party is expressing anger, the responding party
may react more defensively, which poses an added problem for the
mediator.  Calm in the face of emotional expression, and an even-
81. The other partial explanation is that where discrimination is the norm ob-
jecting to it will seem extreme.  At this writing, GEICO auto insurance company is
airing its “So Easy a Caveman Could Do It” ads.  The premise—that cavemen still
exist—gives rise to a series of vignettes in which a caveman is outraged at the GEICO
ads.  In one such ad, a GEICO representative is apologizing for the ad, and in another
a therapist is asking a caveman patient why the ad is so upsetting.  In a third GEICO
ad, a news anchor has two talking heads—a caveman’s, to articulate his complaint,
and a responder who ridicules the complaint.  The ads are a clever presentation of
iconic cultural moments but are troubling because the common thread is the experi-
ence of a disfavored group’s efforts to lay bare, and stop, discrimination.
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handed response to that emotion and its expression are essential
skills for the mediator.
Practice Recommendation 16:  Use the novelty of mediation to es-
tablish new patterns of behavior, but also help the parties return to
the familiar context with a plan for successful change.
Another related matter of perspective is important for the medi-
ator to appreciate.  When a key actor changes the status quo from
chronic discrimination against members of some groups to even-
handedness, members of the audience, both non-targets and
targets, may see the change as favoritism toward members of the
group previously targeted.  This poses difficulties for those seeking
to achieve even-handedness. It is no surprise then that even those
dedicated to even-handedness experience considerable difficulty in
implementing it.
Fortunately, neither the mediation context nor the mediator is
known to the parties.  Accordingly, the parties do not have a set-
tled expectation regarding either and, for the context of mediation,
a status quo does not yet exist.  The mediator who brings self-
aware even-handedness to the table at the outset is less likely to
encounter the entrenched perception that imbalance is fair than,
for example, the manager returning to the workplace from fairness
training.  Moreover, where ADR efforts occur early, in circum-
stances where the stakes for the parties are lower,82 and when the
remedies do not involve zero-sum outcomes, the resistance to
change will be less.  This alone is a strong argument for early inter-
vention both for ADR purposes, but also for workplace manage-
ment generally.
The mediator must not forget that, however successfully the par-
ties resolve difficulties in the mediation room, the durability of me-
diation depends upon translating the balance achieved in
mediation back to the original site of the dispute.  As a result, the
mediator must anticipate the status quo to which the parties will
return and help them plan how to ensure that it incorporates fair-
ness.  It may not be enough, for example, for the male co-worker to
apologize to the female for telling sexist jokes in the lunchroom.
While they are the only parties in the mediation room, they will not
be alone in the lunchroom.  Exploring in mediation the unbalanced
82. See Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century:  Chal-
lenges in a Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 513-24 (2003)
(advocating early intervention in employment discrimination to improve the chances
of successful, continued workplace attachment of the target).
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circumstances present at work and developing some mutual strate-
gies to cope with these would certainly be a richer result.
Practice Recommendation 17:  Use a party’s charges that the me-
diator is being unfair as an opportunity to model receiving and giv-
ing constructive criticism.
Finally, despite our best efforts, mediators may sometimes face
charges of imbalance or unfairness from one or both parties.  How
should the mediator manage complaints by a party concerning the
mediator’s management of the process?  It is critical that the medi-
ator not be spooked by criticism from one party into unfair treat-
ment of another party.  A consistent attitude that the mediator is
committed to balance and fairness dictates that she or he listen to,
but not necessarily agree with, such claims of mediator unfairness.
While nettlesome at first, such charges are actually a valuable
opportunity for the mediator to model the process of receiving and
giving constructive criticism.  Asking the disgruntled party to de-
scribe specific mediator behaviors that she considers unfair or un-
balanced channels the protesting party’s energy away from acting
out and into analysis of process.  An ensuing colloquy in which
concrete actions are examined for unfairness may variously con-
vince the mediator that she was in some measure unfair, the dis-
gruntled party that the feeling or thought of unfairness is or is not
supported, and, at the least, give that party the feeling of being
listened to.
If the disgruntled party resists specifying the behaviors that were
allegedly unfair, the mediator need only insist, “You seem to be
saying that I am doing something wrong [or unfair].  I am willing to
hear you but I won’t be able to change my behavior unless you
describe it to me and tell me how it is unfair.”  Once the specific
behaviors are on the table, the mediator and the parties can work
together to craft a solution, if a solution appears justified.
Whatever the outcome, this process will model for both parties a
way of receiving feedback, listening, and problem-solving.  Outrage
by any party should not, however, take over the mediation process
as that becomes an evasion of solution-seeking.
CONCLUSION
This Article briefly reviewed how five fundamental aspects of
our thinking systematically contribute to our own and other’s bi-
ases and discussed how a mediator might apply this knowledge to
improve fairness and balance in mediation.  Each of these topics—
categorization, attribution, metaphorical expression, norming, and
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framing—have been the subject of extensive scientific research.
Strategic application of any one of these research areas could im-
prove fairness of mediators dramatically.  Systematic practice ap-
plying the guidelines outlined in this Article would be a good first
step toward better mediation.  A long-term program of research
and study to improve upon these guidelines and their application
could mark an important new stage of mediation practice.
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